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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff instituted this action alleging personal injury 
and property damage arising out of the collapse of an open 
storage shed located on defendant's premises. Plaintiff 
alleged that defendants were negligent in failing to remove 
snow from the storage shed. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiffs case was tried to the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, sitting with jury. At the conclusion of plaintiff's 
presentation of evidence, defendant moved for a directed 
verdict, which was granted. The directed verdict was entered 
on December 10, 1986; on December 31, 1986, plaintiff filed his 
notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, which initially 
dismissed the appeal because the docketing statement failed to 
cite the appropriate statutory authority for the appeal. 
Plaintiff petitioned for rehearing, and the Supreme Court 
reinstated the appeal providing that "appellant perfect his 
docketing statement (findings and judgment) within 10 days from 
the date of this notice (April 6, 1987)." Plaintiff filed an 
amended and corrected docketing statement on April 10, 1987. 
On April 24, 1987, the Supreme Court transferred this case 
to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. On February 25, 1983, respondent/defendant Fourthwest 
Investment, Ltd. ("Fourthwest"), entered into a "warehouse 
lease" with Jack Bowman and Doug Campbell. Fourthwest agreed 
to lease certain warehouse space to Bowman and Campbell for the 
stated purpose of "general storage purposes." (Tr. p. 16). 
2. On January 25, 1984, plaintiff/appellant Donald 
Gregory ("Gregory") was following Doug Campbell for the purpose 
of purchasing from him some boxes located at the leased 
premises. (Tr. p. 4) 
3. Access by automobile to the Campbell warehouse was 
blocked by another Fourthwest tenant who was unloading goods 
into another warehouse. As a result, Mr. Campbell and 
plaintiff pulled their respective vehicles underneath an open 
storage shed. As they did so, the shed collapsed resulting in 
alleged property damage and personal injury to plaintiff. (Tr. 
p. 7) 
4. The storage shed in question was not part of the 
warehouse space leased by Fourthwest to Mr. Campbell. (Tr. p. 
17) There was no agreement between Fourthwest and its tenant 
that the storage shed would be used as a parking lot and it was 
not routinely used as a parking lot. (Tr. p. 18) 
5. It had snowed the night prior to the collapse of the 
building and was snowing or raining periodically on the day of 
the collapse. (Tr. pp. 10, 15, 25) 
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6. The storage shed was not dilapidated, run down or 
damaged in any way and appeared to be a safe structure, (Tr. 
p. 19) Mr. Campbell testified that there was nothing which 
would have given him notice of any problem with the storage 
shed. (Tr. p. 19) 
7. On the day of the collapse, a witness by the name of 
Perry McKellar, an employee of another warehouse tenant was 
working near the storage shed. At various times during the day 
of the collapse he heard some noise emanating from the area of 
the storage shed, but did not notify anyone from Fourthwest 
about the noises. (Tr. pp. 30-31) 
8. Upon hearing the noises, Mr. McKellar went over to 
investigate, but did not see anything that prompted him to 
notify Fourthwest. (Tr. pp. 29, 37) 
9. The evidence established that the apportioned weight 
of the snow on the storage shed prior to the collapse of the 
building was between 10.4 pounds and 13.3 pounds per square 
foot. (Tr. p. 50) 
10. Plaintiff presented no evidence as to the cause of the 
collapse, presented no evidence that the defendant had been put 
on notice of any dangerous condition, presented no evidence 
that an inspection by Fourthwest would have revealed any 
structural deficiency with the storage shed, and presented no 
evidence that Fourthwest failed to make reasonable inspections. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Fourthwest's duty to a business customer of one of its 
tenants was to take reasonable precautions to correct or warn 
of dangers it knew existed with regard to non-leased property, 
and which it knew caused an unreasonable risk of harm to 
others. Gregory failed to introduce substantial credible 
evidence that Fourthwest knew or should have known that the 
storage shed represented a danger. Furthermore, he failed to 
produce substantial credible evidence as to the cause of the 
collapse. Because he failed to establish a prima facie case of 
causation and/or breach of duty by Fourthwest, the trial court 
was correct in granting a directed verdict against Gregory at 
the close of his case. 
ARGUMENT 
It is a fundamental legal precept that to prove a case of 
negligence the asserting party must establish the following 
essential elements: 
(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the 
defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that 
duty; (3) the causation, both actually and 
proximately, of injury; and (4) the suf-
fering of damages by the plaintiff. 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). Viewing the 
evidence presented at trial and all reasonable inferences that 
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fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to 
Gregory, as the District Court was and this Court is required 
to do, Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913, 
917 (Utah 1979), there is no substantial evidence to support a 
finding that plaintiff established a prima facie case of negli-
gence. 
I, 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD A DUTY TO 
INSPECT THE STORAGE SHED FOR AN ALLEGED 
DANGEROUS CONDITION 
Gregory asserts that he was an "invitee" of Fourthwest and, 
for that reason, alleges that it owed him a duty to discover 
any conditions on its property posing an unreasonable risk of 
harm to him and either repair or warn against such risks. The 
facts bearing upon Gregory's status at the time of the collapse 
are as follows: 
(1) Plaintiff followed Doug Campbell, a tenant of defen-
dant, onto defendant's premises for the purpose of purchasing 
some boxes from Mr. Campbell. (Tr. p. 4). 
(2) Mr. Campbell and plaintiff parked under a storage shed 
which was not part of the premises leased to Mr. Campbell nor 
was it common area used by all tenants. (Tr. pp. 17-18). 
(3) The use to which defendant's property was contemplated 
was "general storage" and not as a public outlet for the sale 
of goods. (Tr. p. 16). 
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A. Plaintiff's status was that of a "licensee" and not an 
"invitee" and defendant owed him only a duty to 
exercise reasonable care. 
Utah law holds that M[t]he duty owed by a property owner to 
one who is injured on his property depends on whether that 
person is an •invitee,f a 'licensee' or a 'trespasser.'" Tjas 
v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979). At the outset, it 
is essential to remember that this was not a residential lease 
as in the cases cited by appellant in his brief. 
In Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 125 Utah 168, 478 P.2d 496 
(1970), the Utah Supreme Court explained the difference in 
status between an invitee and licensee: 
In considering the duty of a landowner to persons 
coming on his property, it is appropriate to point out 
the distinction between what are termed "invitees" or 
"business visitors" as compared to those who are 
termed "licensees." In order to qualify as the 
former, one who goes on the premises of another must 
do so at the invitation of the owner. This may be 
expressed or it may be implied because it is done in 
connection with the owner's business, or some mutual 
business advantage to the owner. . . . A licensee is 
one who goes on the land of another without any such 
invitation. But in order that he not be a mere 
trespasser, there must be permission from the land-
owner, or at least an implied permission, which may be 
inferred from the latter's knowingly allowing repeated 
use of his land with out objection. 
Id. at 498. 
The reason, of course, for drawing a distinction between 
invitees and licensees is that the duty owed to a licensee is 
-6-
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In the present case, Gregory followed one of Fourthwest*s 
tenants onto the property. Fourthwest was totally unaware of 
Gregory's arrival and in no way encouraged or stood to benefit 
from the relationship between Gregory and Campbell. Gregory 
hints that Fourthwest extended him an implicit invitation since 
the "commercial transaction . . . would ultimately benefit 
defendant." (Appellant's brief, p. 11) No evidence of such a 
benefit was ever introduced. Nothing in the lease agreement 
provides for extra remuneration to be paid to Fourthwest based 
upon volume of sales. Indeed, the lease agreement between 
Fourthwest and Campbell provides that the leased property was 
to be used for "general storage purposes" and not as a retail 
outlet: 
Q. (By Mr. Ferguson) . . . on that lease, there is a 
statement as to what the building is going to be 
occupied for. Do you see that on the first page 
where it says "general storage purposes"? 
A. (By Mr. Campbell) Oh, yes. 
Q. Does that accurately reflect what you intended to 
do with the warehouse space? 
A. Yes. That's what we had in our other warehouse, 
and we moved shipping cartons, and other — a few 
other items in there. 
Q. It wasn't intended as a retail outlet? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where you would have the general public, and pick 
through it? 
A. No. 
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Q. And was that what you discussed with Mi. od*.'... 
and Fourthwest prior to signing this lease that 
that would be the purpose that you were using 
that for? 
A. Yes. 
) 
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Gregory also seeks "invitee" status by arguing that the 
storage shed was an area "common" to all Fourthwest tenants. 
The meaning of a common area is discussed in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 360, (1977): 
A possessor of land who leases a part thereof and 
retains in his own control a part which the lessee is 
entitled to use as appurtenant to the part leased to 
him, is subject to liability to his lessee and others 
lawfully upon the land with the consent of the lessee 
or a sublessee for physical harm caused by a dangerous 
condition upon that part of the land retained in the 
lessor's control, if the lessor by the exercise of 
reasonable care could have discovered the condition 
and the unreasonable risk involved therein and could 
have made the condition safe. 
Id, at 250. 
Applying the Restatement, to establish that Fourthwest owed 
the duty asserted, Gregory had the burden to prove that the 
area of the collapsed building was in fact a "common area". No 
such evidence was ever introduced. Indeed, the undisputed 
testimony of Doug Campbell established that the shed was not a 
common parking lot. (Tr. p. 18). 
Moreover, even if the storage shed could be viewed as a 
common area, comment (e) of the Restatement provides a caveat 
applicable to this case; while the common area may be open for 
the purpose of lessee, "[i]f these purposes do not include the 
reception of licensees therein, a third party entering into the 
yard at the invitation of the lessee is not lawfully there and 
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The Utah Supreme Court has set a similar standard as being 
necessary to prove a landowner's negligence. "[I]n order to 
find the defendant negligent, it must be shown [the landowner] 
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, 
of any hazardous condition and had a reasonable opportunity to 
remedy the same." Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 339, 431 
P.2d 566, 569 (1987).. 
Moreover, it must be reiterated that Gregory produced no 
evidence suggesting a defective condition existed. There was 
no evidence of defective design, defective materials, or defec-
tive construction. Thus, any inference at all of a latent 
defect would be unsubstantiated speculation. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO INTRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF A BREACH OF DUTY 
Assuming Gregory was a "licensee" at the time and location 
of the accident, he failed to introduce substantial evidence 
that Fourthwest breached its duty of reasonable care. There is 
no evidence that it knew of a dangerous condition; indeed, 
there is no substantial evidence that a dangerous condition 
ever existed. The only evidence admitted which is remotely 
relevant to this issue is that there was snow on the roof and 
that the shed collapsed. Such facts cannot support an infer-
ence of negligence. The fact that an accident occurred, 
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dangerous condition, what the dangerous condition was or how, 
in the exercise of reasonable care, Fourthwest could have 
prevented the collapse. As in Martin, without such evidence 
the court correctly a directed verdict for Fourthwest. 
Long v. Smith Food King Store, 521 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973) 
also supports this conclusion. There a customer slipped on a 
piece of pumpkin pie (with whipped cream) which was lying on 
the floor near a sampling table. There was no evidence that 
the store had known of the spill before the accident or of how 
long the pie had been on the floor. Summary judgment for the 
store was granted because it had satisfied its duty of care 
under the circumstances. Its duty to make the store safe for 
customers was limited by a standard of reasonableness because 
without this limitation the store would become the insurer of 
safety. Id. at 362. The court in Long hastened to point out 
that a landowner is not an insurer of its business invitees: 
[N]otwithstanding the admittedly correct rule regui-
ring the defendant to exercise due care and prudence 
for the safety of its business invitees, it never-
theless is not an insurer of their safety. It is 
entitled to have the standard of reasonableness under 
the circumstances applied to its conduct. In applying 
that standard to the guestion as to whether the 
defendant should have been expected to take further 
precautions to avoid injury to its customers, it is 
only fair and proper to make that determination from a 
standpoint of foresight and not hindsight. 
Id. at 362. 
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III. 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE OF CAUSATION. 
Gregory failed to establish the cause of the collapse. 
From his expert's testimony, we know how many pounds of snow 
per foot existed on the roof. Missing, however, is any other 
evidence to connect the amount of snow on the roof to a 
standard; evidence did show that there were 10 to 13 pounds per 
square foot of snow on the roof - such figures are irrelevant, 
however, without the information as to how much weight the shed 
was built to hold. 
Without evidence establishing that Fourthwest caused the 
collapse of the building, through negligence or otherwise, the 
court correctly sustained a motion for a directed verdict. 
Finding themselves in a similar situation, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: "We are not able from the evidence to find any 
support for the further and necessary inference that this con-
dition was caused by any act of the defendant or that the 
defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of it." Koer v. 
Mayfair Markets, supra at 569. In Koer, the court entered 
judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict when 
plaintiff failed to establish that Mayfair Markets in any way 
caused her to slip and fall on a grape. Although the plaintiff 
in Koer clearly established an injury, as has appellant in the 
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present case, the court held that without proper proof of causa-
tion or negligence on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff 
failed to carry her burden of proof. 
CONCLUSION 
In the present case, there was no substantial evidence upon 
which the jury could have decided the causation and negligence 
issues. "The term 'substantial evidence' has been defined as 
'evidence which possesses something of substance and relevant 
consequence and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact 
from which the issues tendered can reasonably be resolved.'" 
Wasson v. Browers Food Mart, Inc., 640 P.2d 352, 357 (Kan. 
1982), citing, Delight Wholesale Corp. v. City of Prairie 
Village, 208 Kan. 246, 249, 491 P.2d 910 (1971). Absent 
substantial evidence a jury cannot operate on anything but 
impermissible speculation: 
In the absence of any proof of negligence or cause, an 
inference of both amounts to nothing more than imper-
missible speculation and conjecture. Although we hold 
jury verdicts in high esteem, such verdicts must 
always be founded upon evidence and not upon specu-
lation and conjecture. When they are not founded upon 
evidence, they cannot stand. 
Id. at 357. 
In this case, Gregory seeks to have inferences of causa-
tion, duty and breach of duty flow from two lonely facts: snow 
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on the roof and collapse of the shed. Absent substantial evi-
dence to tie those facts to a standard and without evidence of 
any negligent act or omission by Fourthwest, Gregory's case 
must fail. 
DATED this jfT day of July, 1987. 
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